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Abstract: This paper attempts to provide an overview of risk assessment and management practice in underground rock 
engineering based on a review of the international literature and some personal experience. It is noted that the terminologies 
used in risk assessment and management studies may vary from country to country. Probabilistic risk analysis is probably 
the most widely-used approach to risk assessment in rock engineering and in geotechnical engineering more broadly. It is 
concluded that great potential exists to augment the existing probabilistic methods by the use of Bayesian networks and 
decision analysis techniques to allow reasoning under uncertainty and to update probabilities, material properties and 
analyses as further data become available throughout the various stages of a project. Examples are given of the use of these 
methods in underground excavation engineering in China and elsewhere, and opportunities for their further application are 
identified. 




1  Introduction  
This paper has been prepared as a contribution to 
the International Summit Forum on Safe 
Construction and Risk Management of Major 
Underground Construction held in Wuhan, China, in 
May 2012, and sponsored by the Chinese Academy 
of Engineering (CAE). The topics listed for 
consideration by the Forum are:  
(1) Mechanism, understanding, prediction theory 
and warning systems of rockburst, collapse, water 
inrush, or large deformation of major underground 
engineering.  
(2) Optimal design methodology of major 
underground engineering under conditions of high 
stress, karst, high water pressure, or weak rocks. 
(3) Risk management methods and strategies for 
safe construction of major underground engineering 
under conditions of high stress, karst, high water 
pressure, or weak rocks. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the consideration 
of the third of these topics by providing an overview 
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of the application of risk assessment and risk 
management in underground rock engineering, based 
largely on a review of the international literature. 
Clearly, the topics of the Forum are of great concern 
in China and to the CAE, as they are elsewhere in the 
world. However, it is important not to lose sight of 
the monumental achievements of rock mechanics and 
rock engineering in China in recent years (Feng, 
2011; Feng and Hudson, 2011; Qian, 2011). 
 
2  Risk management terminology and 
fundamentals  
 
The international literature on risk analysis, 
assessment and management contains a range of 
definitions of risk and associated terms (Paté-Cornell 
and Dillon, 2006). Here, the definitions given by 
AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009 (Standards Australia, 
2009) will be used. It should be noted that these 
definitions differ, sometimes marginally and 
sometimes significantly, from those used in some 
earlier publications, including those by Brown (2007) 
and Brown and Booth (2009). The author 
understands that there is not a specific Chinese risk 
management standard comparable to AS/NZS ISO 
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31000: 2009. Following Zhou and Zhang (2011), it 
will be assumed that the general principles of the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) standard, 
ISO 31000: 2009, will apply. 
Standards Australia (2009) defines risk as “the 
effect of uncertainty on objectives” and a risk source 
as an “element which alone or in combination has the 
potential to give rise to a risk”. In some earlier 
accounts, a risk source appears to have been referred 
to as a hazard, defined in the previous Australian 
Standard as “a source of potential harm” (Standards 
Australia, 2004). This term is not defined in AS/NZS 
ISO 31000: 2009. The underground rock engineering 
conditions of high stress, karst, high water pressure 
and weak rocks could be regarded as hazards in this 
sense. 
The level of risk is defined as the “magnitude of a 
risk or combination of risks, expressed in terms of the 
combination of consequences and their likelihood”. 
This definition allows for the common practice of 
quantifying risk as the product of the likelihood of 
the occurrence of an event and the consequences of 
that event (Stacey et al., 2006; Brown, 2007; Brown 
and Booth, 2009; Einstein et al., 2010). The 
Standards Australia (2009) definition of an event as 
an “occurrence or change of a particular set of 
circumstances” is consistent with this usage. The 
consequence of an event is the “outcome of an event 
affecting objectives” and the likelihood is the 
“chance that something will happen” (Standards 
Australia, 2009). As an example of the differences in 
terminology sometimes encountered, the probability 
of an event occurring is sometimes referred to as a 
hazard (Einstein, 1997; He et al., 2011). 
Fig. 1 illustrates the overall risk management 
process adopted by the ISO and Standards Australia 
(2009). It helps clarify some of the terminology used 
in this area. It is important to recognize that, in this 
approach, the risk identification, risk analysis and 
risk evaluation steps are together known as risk 
assessment, the term used in the title of this paper. 
Similar approaches, sometimes differing in detail, are 
used by a number of other national and international 
authorities (for example, the International Tunnelling 
Association approach outlined by Eskesen et al. 
(2004) and the PIARC approach used by Schubert 
(2011)). Much of that which follows will be directed 
towards the risk analysis and evaluation stages 
identified in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 Risk management process (Standards Australia, 2009). 
 
3  Risk analysis and evaluation 
 
Risk analysis is the process of developing an 
understanding of each of the risks identified in the 
previous risk identification step in Fig. 1. It provides 
an input to decisions on whether or not risks need to 
be treated, and on the most appropriate and 
cost-effective risk treatment strategies. It involves 
consideration of the sources of risk, their 
consequences and the likelihood of those 
consequences occurring. Risks are usually analyzed 
and evaluated by combining their likelihoods and 
consequences. Risk analyses may be qualitative, 
semi-quantitative or quantitative. The following 
paragraphs provide brief overviews for some of the 
risk analysis and evaluation tools that are commonly 
used in geotechnical engineering and tunneling, and 
may be suitable for use in large underground 
construction projects. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) identifies, quantifies 
and represents, in diagrammatic form, the faults and 
failures, and the combinations of faults and failures 
that can lead to a major hazard or event. It may be 
used either with or without quantifying the 
probabilities of events occurring.  
Event tree analysis (ETA) provides a systematic 
mapping of realistic event scenarios having the 
potential to result in a major incident, and the 
relationships, dependencies and potential escalation 
of events with time. It also provides numerical 
estimates of the likelihoods of occurrence of the 
component events and of the escalated event. 
Consequence or cause-consequence analysis is a 
combination of fault tree and event tree analysis. The 
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outcome is a diagram displaying the relationships 
between the causes and the consequences or 
outcomes of an incident. This technique is used most 
commonly when the failure logic is simple because a 
diagram combining fault and event trees can become 
quite complex. 
Fig. 2 shows a generic risk evaluation process for a 
stope in an underground mine that uses simple event 
and fault trees. The possible types of failures are 
shown in the left hand column with a probability of 
failure (POF) determined for each. The middle 
column shows an event tree used to establish several 
types of risk and their impacts or consequences such 
as economic loss, the loss of reputation or the impact 
on workers. The right hand column shows the final 
evaluation of the acceptability or otherwise of these 
risks. This general approach, which was developed 
initially for use in rock slope engineering (Tapia et 
al., 2007; Steffen et al., 2006), could well be used for 
an underground civil engineering excavation, with 
perhaps a modification to the nature of some of the 
risks shown in the central column. 
Bowtie diagrams show how a range of controls 
may eliminate or minimize the likelihood of 
occurrence of specific initiating events that may 
generate risk, or reduce the consequences of an event 
once it has occurred. Bowtie diagrams, originated as 
a technique for analyzing safety incidents, but are 
also useful for analyzing other types of complex risks 
and for communicating key risks and critical controls 
(Quinlivan and Lewis, 2007). Fig. 3 shows a generic 
bowtie diagram which may be adapted to analyze 
geotechnical risks of the types being discussed here. 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), including 
Monte Carlo and other types of simulations, is 
perhaps the most widely used method of quantitative 
risk analysis in geotechnical engineering (Baecher 
and Christian, 2003; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008). 
This approach will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 5 below. 
Decision analysis, including decision tree analysis, 
is a structured format used to analyze or assess the 
outcomes of decisions or choices made, based on the 
available information. Many decisions made in 
underground construction involve significant 
uncertainty. Decision analysis will be discussed 
further in Section 6 below. 
Multi-risk analysis is an approximate 
computational method of calculation for cases 
involving multiple statistically independent risks or 
hazards that are each treated as stochastic variables. 
It provides a method for dealing with uncertainty and 
may be used in estimating costs in tunneling, for 
example the study (Eskesen et al., 2004).
 
 
Fig. 2 A risk evaluation process combining fault and event trees (Stacey et al., 2006).                                 




Fig. 3 Generic bowtie diagram (Brown and Booth, 2009). 
 
The Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) approach 
is used to address ill-defined and ill-structured 
problems in decision making and risk assessment. It 
is a mathematical technique for multi-criterion 
decision-making that allows decision alternatives to 
be ranked based on preferences through pair-wise 
comparisons (Saaty, 1980; Taroun and Yang, 2011). 
This technique has been used relatively widely in the 
Chinese construction industry, sometimes in 
combination with other approaches (Deng and Zhou, 
2010; Zhou et al., 2006). 
Bayesian networks are probability-based graphical 
and mathematical tools that show cause and effect 
relationships between the components of a system. 
They allow for conditional dependence between 
variables, provide a means of reasoning under 
uncertainty, and allow probability tables to be 
updated as more information becomes available. In 
practice, they are usually used in combination with 
some form of decision analysis. Bayesian networks 
and their application in underground engineering will 
be discussed in more detail in Section 6 below. 
In addition to, or in association with, Bayesian 
networks, fuzzy logic and other artificial 
intelligence (AI) methods which have been applied 
in rock engineering (Dershowicz and Einstein, 1984; 
Feng and Jiang, 2010) may also be used in risk 
analysis and evaluation, sometimes in combination 
with other approaches (Choi et al., 2004; He et al., 
2006; Zhou and Zhang, 2011). 
It is important to note that many of the risk 
analyses carried out routinely in engineering practice 
are qualitative or, at best, semi-quantitative (Zhou 
and Zhang, 2011). In the remainder of this paper, 
emphasis will be placed on the development and 
application of quantitative approaches. 
 
4  Geotechnical uncertainty and error 
 
It is important to recognize that in geotechnical 
engineering, including in underground rock 
engineering, many of the risk sources or hazards 
arise from geotechnical uncertainty or error. The 
nature of the uncertainty and the errors that provide 
the sources of geomechanics risk in geotechnical 
engineering more broadly has been discussed widely 
in the literature. For example, Einstein and Baecher 
(1983) classified the sources of uncertainty as:  
(1) inherent spatial and temporal variability;  
(2) measurement errors (systematic or random);  
(3) model uncertainty;  
(4) load uncertainty; and  
(5) omissions. 
Baecher and Christian (2003) and others have 
described these sources of uncertainty as being 
aleatory or epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty is the 
irreducible randomness or variability associated with 
phenomena that are naturally variable in time or 
space, even when the system is well known. The 
discontinuity geometries and the mechanical and 
hydraulic properties of rock masses provide good 
examples of this natural variability. Epistemic 
uncertainty, on the other hand, arises from 
limitations in our fundamental knowledge or 
understanding of some aspects of a problem. This is 
sometimes termed conceptual uncertainty (Brown, 
2007) and may be reflected in the use of 
inappropriate models in analyses, for example.  
Recently, Hadjigeorgiou and Harrison (2011) 
provided a valuable account of uncertainty and the 
sources of error in rock engineering. In discussing 
the use of rock mass classification schemes in the 
design of underground excavations, they identified 
two groups of errors. The first group consists of 
errors intrinsic to the classification scheme used, 
including errors of omission, errors of super- 
fluousness, and errors of taxonomy associated with 
the requirement to select a particular classification 
rating value for a geomechanical property. The 
second group of errors are associated with 
implementation, and include errors of circumstance, 
errors of convenience, errors of ignoring variability, 
and errors of ignoring uncertainty (Hadjigeorgiou 
and Harrison, 2011). 
 
5  Probabilistic risk analysis 
 
For the last 30 or 40 years, probabilistic risk 
analysis (PRA) has probably been the most widely 
used method of quantitative risk analysis, generally 
of the risk of failure, in geotechnical engineering 
more broadly (Baecher and Christian, 2003; Einstein, 
1996; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008; Honjo et al., 2009; 
Event
Time
Cause Pre-event controls 
Post-event 
controls Consequence
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Juang et al., 2011). It is also used in construction 
time and cost estimation (Cretu et al., 2011) and in 
project management in a wide range of engineering 
and other fields (Paté-Cornell, 2007). 
As illustrated in Fig. 4, in the general geotechnical 
probabilistic risk analysis approach we assess a 
probability density function (PDF). Design 
parameters such as the loads, stresses, or 
groundwater pressures, are identified in Fig. 4 as 
Demand. The strength of the soil or rock, often the 
shear strength, is identified in Fig. 4 as Capacity. 
This diagram illustrates how, as we progress from the 
preliminary to the detailed and then the final design 
stage, our knowledge of the design parameters 
improves, or is refined as a result of further 
investigation, and the probability of failure reduces. 
 
Fig. 4 Illustration of uncertainty reduction during the 
development of a project until the potential for failure is 
minimized to an acceptable level (Valley et al., 2010, after 
Hoek, 1991). 
 
Stewart and O’Rourke (2008), among others, 
express the probability of failure when a load 
exceeds a resistance as: 
f r r r( ) ( 0) [ ( ) 0]p P R S P R S P G      X    (1) 
where R is the resistance or capacity, S is the load or 
demand and ( )G X  is a limit state function such 
that ( ) 0G X  defines the boundary between safe 
and unsafe. A factor of safety (FOS) is often 
calculated as /FOS R S , where, in this case, R 
and S are the mean or most likely values of the 
capacity and demand, respectively. Some methods of 
calculation allow for aleatory uncertainty in the 
functions for R and S. However, they generally do 
not allow for epistemic uncertainty, that is a 
conceptual model or parameter uncertainty. 
Therefore, in these cases, allowance should be made 
for model error, ME, in the estimation of R and S:  
( )G ME FOS X                          (2) 
If G R S  , and R and S are statistically 
independent, the probability of failure may be 
calculated as:  
f s( ) ( )dRp F x f x x                          (3) 
where ( )RF x  is the cumulative distribution function 
of the resistance and s ( )f x  is the probability 
distribution function of the load. The probability of 
failure is related to the degree to which the demand 
and capacity distribution curves overlap as illustrated 
in Fig. 4. If both R and S follow normal distributions, 
f 1 ( )p    , where   is called the reliability 
index and is a function of the mean values and the 
standard deviations of R and S. 
The probability distribution functions of R and S 
are often estimated using Monte Carlo, Latin 
Hypercube or other types of simulations using 
commercially available software such as @RISK 
(Palisade Corporation, 2012) and Crystal Ball 
(Oracle Corporation, 2012). In their simplest form, 
these simulations consist of repeated calculations of 
values of R and S, generally using equations 
involving a range of input parameters such as those 
used in stability calculations, selected on a random 
number basis.  
It is often assumed that the probability distribution 
functions involved in these simulations are normal 
distributions. In the case of the geotechnical variables 
used in the estimation of values of capacity and 
demand, this can be a far from reasonable 
assumption. The distributions assumed can have 
significant effects on the results of analyses. In most 
engineering applications, including in geotechnical 
engineering, it is also important to identify the time 
frame over which the probability of failure is 
assessed. For some items of major infrastructure, it 
may be overly conservative to base decisions on the 
probability of a single failure occurring over the 
lifetime of the structure. An average annual 
probability of failure may be more realistic in some 
instances (Stewart and Love, 2005).  
The probability of failure may be related to the 
FOS which engineers have traditionally used and 
often prefer. Table 1 shows probabilities of failure 
and the associated FOSs calculated for coal mine 
pillars in an Australian database compiled by Galvin 
et al. (1999). It must be remembered that the 
fP -FOS relationship is not unique as is sometimes 
supposed, but depends on the input data, the 
boundary conditions and the nature of the 
distributions of R and S resulting in each case. 
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Table 1 Calculated probability of failure versus factor of safety 
for Australian coal mine pillars (Galvin et al., 1999). 
Probability of failure Factor of safety 
8 in 10 
5 in 10 
1 in 10 
5 in 100 
2 in 100 
1 in 100 
1 in 1 000 
1 in 10 000 
1 in 100 000 












Furthermore, this simple probabilistic approach 
does not permit us conveniently to allow for spatial 
variability, uncertainties, effects of pre- or post-event 
controls, dependent relationships between the design 
parameters and variables, and parallel component 
failure in an engineering system. There is a vast body 
of literature discussing the wide range of 
probability-based techniques used in geotechnical 
engineering, often in combination with numerical 
stress, deformation and water flow analyses, and in 
many other fields of engineering (Baecher and 
Christian, 2003; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008; 
Paté-Cornell, 2007; Stewart and Melchers, 1997). 
Only the simplest case has been introduced here in 
order to provide an indication of the nature of 
probabilistic risk analysis. 
 
6  Bayesian networks and dynamic 
Bayesian networks for quantitative 
risk analysis 
 
Many of the complexities referred to above may be 
taken into account using a Bayesian network (BN) 
approach. BNs are based on Bayes’ theorem or 
Bayes’ law which is a relationship between 
probabilities developed by Thomas Bayes (Bayes, 
1763). In its simplest form, Bayes’ theorem may be 
written as:  
( ) [ ( ) ( )] / ( )P A B P B A P A P B                (4) 
where ( )P A  is the probability of A, ( )P B  is the 
probability of B, and ( )P A B  and ( )P B A  are the 
conditional probabilities of A given that B has 
occurred, and those of B given A. In the Bayesian 
interpretation, probability measures a degree of belief 
so that what will be referred to here as Bayesian 
networks is sometimes referred to as Bayesian belief 
networks (Charles River Analytics, 2008; Lee et al., 
2009). A more complex way of expressing Bayes’ 
theorem includes a hypothesis, past experience, and 
evidence: 
( ,  ) ( ) ( ,  ) / ( )P H E c P H c P E H c P E c        (5) 
where we can update our belief in hypothesis H 
given additional evidence, E, and the background 
context or past experience, c. The left-hand term, 
( ,  )P H E c  is called the posterior probability of 
hypothesis H after considering the effect of the 
evidence of the past experience, c. The term ( )P H c  
is called the a priori probability of H given c alone. 
The term ( ,  )P E H c  is called the likelihood and 
gives the probability of the evidence assuming that 
the hypothesis, H, and the background information, c, 
are true (Charles River Analytics, 2008). 
Fig. 5 illustrates the components of a simple 
Bayesian network, notably (1) the causal model 
shown by the nodes and their links, and the 
probability tables forming the Bayesian network 
itself; (2) the input of expert knowledge; and (3) the 
use of inference in decision-making (Smith, 2006). 
 
Fig. 5 Bayesian network components (Smith, 2006). 
 
In geotechnical engineering, dynamic BNs which 
allow for changes in the decisions, relationships and 
probabilities with time are especially useful. In this 
approach, the probability tables for the variables 
involved may be updated as more information 
becomes available during the lifetime of the project. 
There are many ways of defining and describing 
BNs. Formally, a BN may be defined as a concise 
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graphical representation of the joint probability of a 
domain that is represented by a set of random 
variables (Russell and Norvig, 2009; Sousa and 
Einstein, 2012). In summary, it may be said that a 
BN: 
(1) is a graphical and mathematical tool or causal 
model showing cause and effect relationships 
between the components of a system; 
(2) represents the variables in a system as nodes 
and their dependencies by directional links; 
(3) quantifies the strengths of these dependencies 
by conditional probabilities; 
(4) allows for both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties in assessing probabilities;  
(5) allows the probabilistic model (generally 
probability tables) to be updated as new information 
becomes available, for example as a result of further 
site investigation or monitoring during excavation;  
(6) synthesizes and unifies knowledge related to 
the problem;  
(7) uses reasoning under uncertainty by means of 
inferences; and 
(8) can substitute for both fault and event trees. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the concept of the unification of 
expert knowledge and mathematical reasoning for a 
given problem or domain in a BN. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Knowledge unification with Bayesian networks 
(Conrady and Jouffe, 2011). 
 
Fig. 7 shows an example of a simple BN. The 
arrows going from one variable to another reflect the 
relationships between the variables represented by 
the nodes. For example, the arrows going from C to 
B1 and B2 indicate that C has a direct influence on 
both B1 and B2. In order to obtain results or answers, 
inference is used to compute answers to queries made 
to the network (Sousa and Einstein, 2012).  
 
Fig. 7 A simple Bayesian network (Sousa and Einstein, 2012). 
 
The two most common types of queries made are 
the a priori probability distribution of a variable and 
the posterior distribution of variables in the light of 
evidence, generally available from observations 
made. The a priori probability distribution of a 
variable may be written as: 
1




P P X X  A A             (6) 
where A is the query variable and X1 to Xk are the 
remaining variables in the network. This type of 
query can be used in the design phase of an 
underground excavation, for example, to assess the 
probability of failure under certain design 
assumptions concerning geology, geotechnical 
properties and hydrogeology. 
The posterior distribution of variables given 
evidence or observations is given by 
1  
1
( ,  )( )








A e       (7) 
where e is a vector of all the evidence. This type of 
query is used to update knowledge of the state of one 
variable, or variables, when other variables (the 
evidence variables) are observed. This sort of query 
could be used to update the probability of failure of 
an underground excavation, for example, after 
construction has started and new information on the 
geology, hydrogeology or geotechnical properties 
becomes available (Sousa and Einstein, 2012). 
The simplest, but least efficient, way of carrying 
out inferences with this approach is to use these 
equations to calculate the probabilities of every 
possible combination of values of the variables and 
identify those needed to obtain the result. Several 
algorithms are available for carrying out efficient 
exact and approximate inference in BNs. The most 
commonly used exact inference method is the 
variable elimination algorithm (Jensen and Nielsen, 
2007; Sousa and Einstein, 2012). 
In practice, decision analysis is often used in 











Unified knowledge representation 
C
B1
A F G H 
E
B2 B3 B4
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management and decision-making approach (Smith, 
2010). Decision analysis is a well-developed 
specialist field that has been defined in a variety of 
ways. Paté-Cornell and Dillon (2006), for example, 
regarded it as the classic expected-utility framework 
based on the axioms of rational choices (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) together with 
methods of problem structuring, probability 
assessment, single and multi-attribute preference 
assessment, modeling approaches such as decision 
trees, influence diagrams, and sensitivity analysis. 
Others adopt fewer restrictive definitions which 
include methods such as the analytic hierarchy 
process (Saaty, 1980). Detailed examples of the use 
of decision analysis in conjunction with BNs are 
given by He et al. (2011) and Sousa and Einstein 
(2012).  
Fig. 8 shows the basic structure of the construction 
strategy decision model used by Sousa and Einstein 
(2012). In this case, the decision model is based on a 
decision graph which is a BN (greatly simplified as 
shown in Fig. 8) extended to model different actions 
or alternatives and the associated utilities or 
consequences. The model shows two chance nodes 
(geological condition and failure mode), one decision 
node (construction strategy) and one utility node (the 
total cost), which represents the sum of the costs 
associated with the different construction strategies 
and the utilities associated with failure. The model 
determines the optimal or best alternatives based on 
the maximization of utility, for example by the 




Fig. 8 Basic structure of a construction decision model (Sousa 
and Einstein, 2012). 
 
Currently, BNs are used throughout the world, 
including in China, to assess probabilities and risks 
in an extremely wide range of fields including 
sciences, medicine (particularly in medical diagnosis), 
criminal forensics, several fields of engineering 
including the construction industry, project 
management and in the finance and insurance 
industries–in fact, in any field that involves 
relationships between probabilities. In geotechnical 
and underground engineering, BNs have been 
applied to risk assessment and management in dam 
engineering (Smith, 2006), in tunneling (Sousa and 
Einstein, 2007, 2012; Špačková and Straub, 2011), in 
electric power industry construction projects (Jia et 
al., 2011), in assessing the rock fall hazards along 
highways (Straub and Schubert, 2008), in assessing 
natural threats or hazards (Einstein and Sousa, 2006; 
Einstein et al., 2010), in the underground injection of 
carbon dioxide (He et al., 2011), and in a particularly 
sophisticated case of a deep foundation pit 
construction project for the Shanghai Metro (Zhou 
and Zhang, 2011).  
In geotechnical engineering more broadly, BNs are 
perhaps most commonly used to update probability 
tables, model parameters, analyses and design curves 
as more data become available following further 
investigation or during construction (Christian and 
Baecher, 2011; Najjar and Saad, 2011; Sousa and 
Einstein, 2012). Recognizing the power of BNs in 
this regard, Christian and Baecher (2011) asked 
recently, “Why haven’t we used it (Bayes’ theorem) 
to bring the observational method into the 21st 
century?”  
 
7  Applications to underground rock 
engineering 
 
In the author’s experience, risk assessment and 
management techniques are applied most commonly 
in underground engineering projects through a 
qualitative or a semi-quantitative approach. 
Generally, a risk register is developed, identifying 
the risk events potentially associated with the project 
in each of several disciplinary fields (such as 
geotechnical or rock engineering); the likelihoods 
and consequences of each of these risk events; the 
control, counter, mitigation measures planned or 
required to be put in place (see Fig. 3); the residual 
risks existing following the implementation of these 
control measures; and the “ownership” of the risk. A 
formal means of updating the risks following the 
implementation of control measures will be outlined 
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below. It would normally be expected that the risks 
associated with events such as rockbursts, large 
deformations, collapses, karst, water inrushes and 
weak rock would be listed in such a risk register. The 
consequences may be a range of economic or 
non-economic impacts on the project, such as those 
identified in Fig. 2. Likelihoods are usually assessed 
over a given period of time.  
Most organizations use this approach to develop 
likelihood and consequence ratings for each risk 
event by providing overall risk ratings based on 
qualitative or semi-quantitative scales. These ratings 
may be updated throughout the development of a 
project from the conceptual and various design stages 
through to construction. A typical qualitative risk 
determination matrix and the associated general risk 
management options for risk levels E, H, M and L 
are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Qualitative risk determination matrix and risk 
management options (Brown and Booth, 2009). 
Consequences Likelihood 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
A H H E E E 
B M H H E E 
C L M H E E 
D L L M H E 
E L L M H H 
E: Extreme risk—immediate action required; unacceptable risk 
H: High risk—senior management attention required; unacceptable risk 
without action 
M: Moderate risk—management responsibility, acceptable with control 
measures 
L: Low risk—manage routine procedures; acceptable risk 
 
As discussed in Section 5, quantitative 
probabilistic risk analysis is now widely used in 
geotechnical and underground rock engineering. And 
as noted in Section 6, the extension of quantitative 
probabilistic methods through the use of BNs and 
decision analysis is now practiced commonly, if not 
universally, in a number of fields, including 
underground rock engineering and construction 
engineering more generally. These methods would 
appear to have great potential to contribute to the 
improved assessment and management of the risks 
encountered in underground rock engineering 
projects. It is considered that they could be applied to 
greater effect during the site investigation, in the 
various stages of project development and design, in 
construction time and cost estimation, and in the 
construction management stages of underground rock 
engineering projects. 
An approach suggested for adaptation and 
adoption in underground rock engineering is that 
developed by Einstein for dealing with natural 
geotechnical threats or hazards (Einstein, 1997; 
Einstein and Sousa, 2007; Einstein et al., 2010). This 
approach uses the structure of decision making under 
uncertainty to formalize the risk assessment process 
for natural threats or for geotechnically-related 
threats of the types being considered here. In 
Einstein’s terminology, potential threats or events are 
combined with a probability to express a hazard. This 
in turn is combined with consequences to express a 
risk, R, as: 
[ ] ( )R P T u  C                            (8) 
where [ ]P T  is the probability of the threat or 
hazard, and ( )u C  is the utility of the consequences 
where C is a vector of attributes using a multi- 
attribute approach (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
The fact that the consequences are uncertain, often 
called the vulnerability, is expressed by the 
conditional probability, [ ]P TC , so that the risk may 
be expressed as:  
[ ] [ ] ( )R P T P T u  C C                     (9) 
Assuming that as a result of the active control or 
mitigation measures (e.g. support or drainage) put in 
place as discussed earlier in this section, [ ]P T  is 
reduced to [ ]P T , and that passive countermeasures 
(e.g., monitoring) reduce the vulnerability [ ]P TC  
to [ ]P T C , or reduce the consequences from ( )u C  
to ( )u C , or both.  
The implementation of control measures involves 
costs, so that the reduced risk for active counter 
measures can be written as: 
[ ] [ ] ( ) ( )R P T P T u u    C C CA             (10) 
where ( )u CA  is the utility, or in simpler terms, the 
cost, of the active counter measures. Similar 
expressions can be formulated for passive counter 
measures or for combinations of active and passive 
controls. Einstein and Sousa (2007) also showed how 
Bayesian updating can be used to represent the fact 
that not all control measures may be 100% effective 
in practice. 
A detailed account of the general rock engineering 
design process has been given by Feng and Hudson 
(2011), which represents the outcome of the work of 
the Commission on Rock Engineering Design 
Methodology of the International Society for Rock 
Mechanics in the period 2007–2011. Although the 
book has many outstanding features and is to be 
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highly recommended, it does not include any specific 
formal treatment of risk assessment and management 
methods, although these topics are considered 
indirectly or implicitly throughout the book. It is 
suggested that the formal, quantitative methods of 
risk assessment and management outlined above 
could be a suitable topic for consideration in the 
future work of the Commission and in future editions 
of the book by Feng and Hudson (2011). 
Although, as discussed in Section 6 and earlier in 
this Section, the literature contains a number of 
examples of the advanced use of risk assessment and 
management methods in underground rock 
engineering, in geotechnical engineering more 
broadly, and in construction management in China, it 
is suspected that, as is generally the case elsewhere in 
the world, greater use could be made in China of 
both the more routine qualitative and semi-qualitative 
and the more formal quantitative methods of risk 
assessment summarized in this paper. Although more 
than four years have passed since their paper’s 
publication, a study reported by Tang et al. (2007) 
identified some advances made, and some scope for 
improvement, in the use of risk management in the 
Chinese construction industry. They suggested that, 
inter alia, “current risk management systems are 
inadequate to manage project risks, and the lack of 
joint risk management mechanisms is the key barrier 
to adequate risk management”. They further 
suggested that “future studies should be conducted to 
systematically improve the risk management in 
construction by different approaches that facilitate 
equitable sharing of rewards through effective risk 
management among participants. Such studies 
should also consider the establishment of an open 
communication risk management process to permit 
the corporate experience of all participants, as well 
as their personal knowledge and judgment, to be 
effectively utilized.” 
 
8  Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to provide an overview 
of risk assessment and management practice in 
underground rock engineering based on a review of 
the international literature and some personal 
experience. The contributions made by Einstein, 
Sousa and their co-workers were found to be 
especially informative (Einstein, 1996, 1997; 
Einstein and Baecher, 1983; Einstein and Sousa, 
2007; Einstein et al., 2010; He et al., 2011; Sousa, 
2010; Sousa and Einstein, 2007, 2012).  
The terminologies used in risk assessment and 
management studies may vary from country to 
country. Probabilistic risk analysis is probably the 
most widely-used approach to risk assessment in 
rock engineering and in geotechnical engineering 
more broadly. It is concluded that great potential 
exists to augment the existing probabilistic methods 
by the use of Bayesian Networks and decision- 
making analysis techniques to allow reasoning under 
uncertainty and to update probabilities, material 
properties and analyses as further data become 
available through the various stages of an 
underground project. Examples have been given of 
the use of these more formal methods in underground 
excavation engineering in China and elsewhere, and 
opportunities for their further application have been 
identified. It is suggested that the risks associated 
with events such as rockbursts, large deformations, 
collapses, karst, water inrushes and weak rock could 
be assessed and managed using these methods. 
Finally, it is suggested that an opportunity exists to 
incorporate these methods into the rock engineering 
design methodology developed by Feng and Hudson 
(2011). 
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